Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/11189/6509
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dc.contributor.authorJohn, Ayoola Tajudeenen_US
dc.contributor.authorOgechukwu, Obokoh Lawrenceen_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-28T06:27:55Z-
dc.date.available2018-08-28T06:27:55Z-
dc.date.issued2018-
dc.identifier.issn2220-6140-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11189/6509-
dc.description.abstractThe study investigates the effect of corporate governance on financial distress in the Nigerian banking industry and examines the discriminatory power of corporate governance mechanism of the board, audit committee, executive management and auditor in one model for financial distress prediction. Secondary data obtained from annual financial statements of twenty banks between 2005 and 2015 were used for the study. The data were analyzed using descriptive statistics and generalized quantile regression model. The empirical evidence from the study suggests that financially distressed banks are characterized by large board size with members who may not be well versed in banking complexities, chairmen and CEOs with significant shareholding both individually and collectively. Furthermore, the evidence also shows that distressed banks suffer major decline in customer deposits despite increase in size. The study concludes that financial distress can be caused by poor corporate governance mechanism.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherJournal of Economics and Behavioral Studiesen_US
dc.relation.ispartofJournal of Economics and Behavioral Studiesen_US
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/za/-
dc.subjectBanking industryen_US
dc.subjectCorporate governanceen_US
dc.subjectFinancial distressen_US
dc.subjectNigerian experienceen_US
dc.titleCorporate governance and financial distress in the banking industry: Nigerian experienceen_US
dc.type.patentArticleen_US
Appears in Collections:BUS - Journal Articles (DHET subsidised)
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