Strengthening parliamentary scrutiny during crises: institutionalising the emergency parliament in zimbabwe

Abstract

Following the designation of the Corona Virus disease 2019 (COVID-19) as a global pandemic by the World Health Organisation in March 2020 and the subsequent declaration of a State of Disaster by the government of Zimbabwe, the Parliament of Zimbabwe struggled to exercise legislative oversight over the emergency response measures that were being implemented by the Executive due to an oversight vacuum created by legal and institutional weaknesses at parliamentary level. While governments have a legitimate responsibility to protect their citizens during national emergencies, the use of unchecked emergency powers by the Executive, a corresponding increase in corruption, rule of law violations, and unaccountable public spending raises legitimate questions about the resultant accountability deficit. Centred on the theoretical lens of Democratic Legitimacy Principal Agent and New Institutionalism theories, this study aims to introduce the concept of an Emergency Parliament by proposing an Emergency Oversight Model that would guide the Parliament of Zimbabwe in exercising oversight over the Executive in future national emergencies. Using evidence that was generated from a systematic review of global legislative responses to COVID-19 .– conducted as part of a Doctoral study, this paper makes the case that, for parliaments to have oversight certainty and legislative continuity over Executive actions during public emergencies, there is a need for a structured oversight system to guide their response. The proposed Emergency Oversight Model has universal applications and can be adapted for application in countries with Westminster style legislative systems.